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PRELIM:A~ANDUM

June 18, 1981 Conference
List 1, Sheet 5
No. 80-1925
UNITED TRANSP. UNION

Cert to CA 2
(Mulligan, Spears,
and Sweet, (D.J.))

v.
LONG ISLAND ~
RAILROAD CO.~
1.

SUMMARY:

¥-

g

Timely

Federal/Civil

Whether the operation of a state-owned railroad

is a traditional and integral governmental function, within the
meaning of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426

u.s.

833, and

therefore constitutionally shielded from the provisions of the
Railway Labor Act?
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FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

Resp is a rail commQn carrier

serving five counties within the metropolitan New York city area.

..

Resp was acquired
by New
.....
............_,..,York State in 1966 and carries
approximately 250,000 passengers each weekday.

Petr is one of

seven collective bargaining representatives for resp's operating
and train employees.

Beginning in 1979, petr brought suits

seeking a declaratory judgment that the relationship between the
parties was governed by the Railway Labor Act, 45
~·

u.s.

§ 151 et

which permits strikes by covered employees and that the

employees could thus not be subjected to the sanctions of New

-

York's Taylor Law, N.Y. Civ. Cir. Law § 200-214, which prohibited
strikes by public employees.
Following much procedural pestering, the DC eventually found
that resp was a "carrier" engaged in interstate transportation
and therefore subject to the Railway Labor Act.

It also

concluded that the federal scheme preempts the state from
regulating the labor relations of the railroad employees.
The CA 2 reversed.

It agreed that resp is subject to the

literal terms of the RLA, that it is a "carrier".

Relying on

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), it
nonetheless held that application of the RLA to resp is not
within the authority granted to Congress under the Commerce
Clause.

In reaching that result, the CA 2 relied primarily on

Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion.

It first concluded that

the State's operation of a passenger rail service, as
distinguished from a freight service, to be an "integral
governmental function".

It is a service that the state and local

-

3 -

governments are particularly suited to provide because of the
community wide need and it is a service that they have come to
provide because economic consideration have eliminated most
private suppliers.
California, 297

u.s.

The CA thus distinguished United States v.
175 (1936) which concluded that a state's

operation of a freight service
governmental activities.

wa~

not an integral part of their

The CA then held that the RLA displaces

"essential governmental decisions", namely, the ability of the
state to structure its employer-employee relationships.

Not only

is the particular activity involved here essential to the public,
it is also essential that the government step in to furnish it.
Turning to Justice Blackmun's balancing test, the CA
concluded that there was no demonstrably greater federal interest
which overrides the State's interests.

First, the objectives of

the RLA are consistent with those of the Taylor Law, to provide
an orderly method of dispute resolution and to ensure continuous
service.

The Taylor Law seeks to further that purpose, thereby

helping the resp to maintain its status as a "vital link" in the
flow of interstate commerce.

Second, the state has a far greater

interest in dispute resolution related to resp than does the
federal government.

The federal interest in preserving the right

of resp's employees to strike is not "demonstrably greater" than
New York State's interest in preventing strikes.

Strikes by

resp's employees must be discouraged so as to ensure continuous
passenger service for so many daily commuters.
distinguished

The CA

Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435

- 4 -

u.s.

389 on the grounds that Usery did not control there because

of the presumption against implied repeals of the antitrust laws.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

(1) The decision below conflicts with such

cases as California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553; United States v.
California, 295
184.

u.s.

175, and Pardon v. Terminal R. Co., 377

u.s.

Those cases upheld the application of federal railroad

legislation, including the RLA, to the operations of state-owned
common carriers engaged in interstate commerce.

Indeed, in

Usery,_this Court expressly asserted that the decision of United
States v. California was not inconsistent with its decision.
U.S., at 854, n. 18.

In sum, theCA has misapplied Usery.

383
It

has substituted the Usery test of "traditionality" and
"integrability" for an "essentiality" test, with "essentiality"
,,

to be gauged not only in terms of the nature of the public
service, but also its availability in the marketplace.

In

broadening the scope of Usery to include a state operated
interstate freight/commuter railroad, the CA deviates from a line
of decisions which had properly given narrow construction to
Usery.
(2) The RLA does not displace the state's power to make
"essential governmental decisions".
County, 590 F.2d 128 (CA 5)

Cf. Pearce v. Witchita

(Congress may constitutionally impose

the provisions of the Equal Pay Act on state employers).

The RLA

does not impose federal standards on the decisions the State must
make with respect to wages, hours, and conditions of employment.
It simply requires the State to bargain collectively with petrs.

The RLA is not directed to the States, but to the operation of
interstate railroads.
(3) Nor does the State have a greater interest in dispute
resolution than the federal government.
ineffective.

The Taylor Law is simply

Since its enactment there have been close to 300

strikes by public employees.

Nor do these stoppages have a

devastating economic effect on the community.

Nor is there any

support for the CA's proposition that the provision of passenger
transportation has "to be supplied primarily by state and local
governments."
Resp

asser~s

that the decision below fully conforms to the

holding in National League of Cities.

Surely when the federal

government instructs a State that it must permit its employees to
strike to enforce their wage demands, there has been as much an
abrogation of the State's otherwise plenary authority to
structure its relationship with its employees as there was in
National League of Cities.

The CA properly included public

transit within the National League of Cities doctrine.

Surely a

transit system such as resp's, which transports 250,000 people
each day, is providing an integral public service.

As to petr's

emphasis on the word "traditional", the provision of public
transit by the state is not an new phenomenon.

In any event,

transit has changed and it is more a public service than ever
before.

Even if not quite "traditional" the provision of the

service is certainly integral.
are irrelevant.

The railroad cases cites by petr

Freight railroading in the United States--as

opposed to local passenger railroading--is still a private sector

- 6 function.

All the cases cited by petr are concerned with freight

railroading.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The issue is important.

In my view, the CA

made a reasonable effort to apply the principles announced in
National League of Cities though the extent to which National
League of Cities should be applied to federal regulation of state
activities is a subject of continuing uncertainty.
Although a GVR in light of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
might be appropriate, Hodel stikes me as readily distinguishable
since the regulation here clearly affects states as states.
would deny.
There is a response.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
To: Mr. Justice Powell
January 11 1 1982
From: John Wiley
No. 80-1925: United Transportation Union v. Long Island RR Co

Question Presented
Whether application of the Railway Labor Act to the
Long Island RR (LIRR) violates National League of Cities.

I.

Discussion

This case is similar to FERC v. Mississippi

(which is

being argued the day before) because both turn on an interpretation of National League of Cities.
ern word

processing 1

I

will

crib my

With the miracle of modintroductory

discussion

regarding National League of Cities from my FERC bench memo.
(I do this--at the risk of boring you--both to avoid cumbersome
cross referencing 1

and because you may read

this memo before

2.

the FERC bench memo.)
As stated in the FERC bench memo, the Virginia Surface
Mining decision from last Term stated that the National League
of Cities test has four elements:

(1) whether a federal stat-

ute regulates "States as States;" (2) whether the federal regulation

addresses

indisputable

sovereignty;"

(3)

whether

state

"to

structure

ability

traditional functions;" and
fends

all

three

of

the

the

of

state

directly

impairs

"attributes

federal

law

integral operations
(4)

areas of

whether--if a federal law of-

foregoing

independence--the nature of the

in

principles

of

state

federal

interest nevertheless

is such as to justify state submission.

(The first three re-

quirements were listed together

in text, while the fourth was

101 s.ct. at 2366 & n.29.

added in a footnote.)

The Virginia Surface Mining case was decided on the
first ground:

that the strip mining regulations concerned pri-

vate activity rather than "States as States."
S.Ct. at 2369.

See, e.g., 101

The Railway Labor Act in this case, however, is

more like the minimum wage law in National League of Cities,
because the Railway Labor Act imposes obligations on state employers

(primarily

the

obligation

to permit

strikes)

in

the

same manner as did the 1974 amendments to the minimum wage act.
Consequently I have no serious doubt but that the Railway Labor
Act

regulates

lenge

to

the

"States as States." Therefore the LIRR' s chalfederal

law satisfies

the

first

element of

the

National League of Cities test--which distinguishes this case

3

0

from Virginia Surface Mining.
As also stated in the FERC memo, the second (indisputable attributes of state sovereignty)

and third

(displacement

of state ability to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional functions)
ies

test

are

elements of the National League of Cit-

difficult

for

me

to differentiate.

Again,

for

purposes of this memo, I will assume that the second test does
not supplement the third test in a way that is material to this
case.
Turning

then

to

the

third

element

(displacement of

state ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions), it is important to note an initial ambiguity.
or

This third step might in fact represent a single inquiry,

it could be two distinct sub-tests.

portant.

The difference is im-

It depends on whether "integral operations" and "tra-

ditional functions"

represent

rephrasings of the same notion,

or whether the two phrases are additive requirements, both of
which must be satisfied before the Tenth Amendment protects a
given state action from federal invasion.
The difference can be illustrated with the hypothetical used in the FERC bench memo.

Suppose California decides to

embark on a space exploration program.
gress passes a minimum wage

law

Suppose also that Con-

similar

to

that in National

League of Cities, except that the law applies only to federal
and

state

Tenth

government

Amendment

space

prohibit

exploration
the

programs.

application

of

would

this

law

the
to

·.

4.

California?
Yes, if the third test is a single inquiry.

National

League of Cities makes clear that wage determination is an integral

state

activity.

With only

slight

semantic difference

one can also say that it is traditional for states to determine
their own wage policy.
But if the third test is a double inquiry, the Tenth
Amendment would not constrain the application of this federal
law.

As

before,

National

League

wage determination is integral.

of

Cities

establishes

that

But this federal usurpation of

an integral state operation would not displace the state in an
area

of

traditional

functions--because

it

is

not

traditional

for states to explore space.
My sense
pronged

test.

is that the third

inquiry should be a two-

The language of National League of Cities leads

me to this conclusion.

See 426

u.s.

at 851:

[The 1974 amendments to the wage act will]
significantly alter or displace the States'
abilities to structure employe ~ -employer relationships in such areas as "'f ire prevention,
police protection, "'S anitation, "-public health,
parks and vf ecreation.
These activities are
typical of those performed by ~ e an~ local
governments in discharging their dual --rllnctions
administering the public law and furnishing public services.
Indeed, it is functions such as these whi
vernments are ereated to provide, s
1ces s
as these which
the States have
radi tionall
afforded their
( citizens (emphasi added).

or

I also think this is wiser of the two possible interpretations.

To hold otherwise would permit states to insulate

themselves from federal regulation in fields that traditionally

'

.

'.
·r;

5.

have been national matters, simply by establishing programs in
those fields.

A contrary decision also could cut the National

League of Cities doctrine off from its concern with preserving
historic state roles.

The doctrine instead would focus on the

general need for protecting state autonomy in any area in which
a

state might chose

to

become

involved.

This

idea seems to

accord more with the concept of states in the Articles of Confederation than with the notion of states in the present Constitution.
If

you

accept

the

idea

of

a

two part

test

for

the

third step of the National League of Cities inquiry, the next
problem

is

problem.

to
The

apply
easier

each
issue

of

these

two parts

is whether

to

the present

the Railway Labor Act

displaces state ability to structure "integral" operations.
think the answer

-

to this question must be yes.

I

The essential

feature of the Railway Labor Act to which the LIRR objects is
the employees' statutory right to strike.

While this right is

encumbered by waiting periods (that have been increased by the
Railway Labor Act amendments passed since the CA2 decision), I
still believe that whether or not to confer the right to strike
is

a

basic employer

policy choice.

It

is

"integral,"

in my

judgment.
This leaves the second half of the third test:
er

the operation of

state government.

the LIRR is a

wheth-

"traditional function"

This question is the crux of this case.

of
Its

resolution will be important from the perspective of precedent.

6.

56-.s

The SG makes five arguments why operation of the LIRR
not a "traditional function."
First, National League of
Cities reaffirmed the holding in United States v. California,
is

297

u.s.

175 (1936), and stated explicitly that "operation of a

railroad engaged in 'common carriage by rail in interstate commerce'" was

"not

in an area that the States have regarded as

intergral parts of their governmental activities."
854 n.l8.
(1964)

See

also Parden v.

(operation of

a

Terminal R.

common carrier

Co. ,

railroad

426

u.s.

377 U.S.

at
18 4

in interstate

commerce by a State constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity
and consent to a FELA suit in federal court) and California v.
Taylor,

353 U.S.

553,

568

(1957)

("If California, by engaging

in interstate commerce by rail, subjects itself to the commerce
power

so that Congress can make

requirements,

it

......

-

also

has

------

it conform to federal safety

subjected

itself

to

that power

so

that Congress can regulate its employment relationships.")
Second, the federal government has a long history

of ~

-

involvement in the regulation of railroads.
------- Third, the history of the LIRR and the behavior of NY
Metropolitan Transportation Authority
litigation belie MTA' s
traditional

in this particular

claim that operation of the LIRR is a

state activity.

last century, and was

(MTA)

The LIRR was established

~operated

publi: ally until

in the

1~ .

And

the MTA did not take the formal steps of reorganizing the LIRR
to claim that

the Railway Labor Act did not apply until this

very litigation.

."'.,.
''·

•..
,,

'.

...•

7.

Fourth,

of

the

17 commuter

railroads

in

the

United

States, only two are publicly owned and operated.

~----------~,---------------------?

--

Fifth, the LIRR is a link in the national freight and
passenger rail network.

In reply, resps' do not attempt to argue that states
historically have operated commuter railroads.
fore wins

if the "tradi tiona! function"

The SG there-

test is cast in his-

torical terms.

Resps' argument instead is--as it must be--that

the

"tradi tiona!

content of

means

other

than

in

various

phrased

functions"

historical
ways,

but

must be determined by

reference.
it

is

Their

best

proposal

captured

by

is

their

statement that

National League of Cities "is

triggered

on

by

service at

the

~b'),(.

government ,~

particular

or the length of time

ing which the State has been involved in its provision."
brief at

19

(emphasis

added).

See also id.

at 20

dur- ~

Red

("by 1980

transit service had become overwhelmingly a public function in
the United States"):

id.

at 21

("without public transit,

the

City of New York could not survive as a vital entity").
This proposed "public dependence" test plainly is incomplete.

The City of New York also would

have a difficult

time surviving without food or national defense.

Yet the for-

mer good is primarily supplied by the private sector

(with an

assist from a federally financed national highway system) , and
the latter
government.

~·.

function

is the exclusive preserve of

Obviously neither

$~

the federal

is immune from federal regula-

8.

tion.

Resps

hint

at

this

incompleteness when

they concede,

"[o] f course, the Constitution does not require that

~

ser-

vice which the State chooses to provide be deemed immune from
federal commerce regulation."

Red brief at 22.

If this approach is to succeed at all, a key additional element must be added--an element that resps mention only in
passing.

See id. at 24

("the people of New York have an ex-

traordinary and special need for public transportation, which
only the State of New York is available to satisfy")

added) •
against

Crucial
federal

to

any

test

regulation

that

for

a

defines

given

a

state

state

(emphasis
immunity

act must

be

a

showing--not only that the state act services a need on which
there
that

is public dependence

for

governmental action,

but also

the act will not be supplied by the federal government.

The most

logical

reason why

the

federal government will not

supply certain services is that the need being serviced is too
localized for national attention.
crucial part of

such

a

state

And the reason why this is a

immunity

test

is that, without

such a requirement, National League of Cities could become a
bar against federal action in areas in which all agree there is
a need for a national response.
It would broaden National League of Cities to interpret it in this manner.
pretation would be wise.
plication of

federalism

I have doubts whether such an interCertainly it is a more activist aplimitations.

This

reading would

not

only entitle states to unimpeded administration of traditional

.,-

·'.

9.

state functions ("in areas such as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation,"
National League of Cities,

426 U.S.

at 851) •

It also would

grant states hegemony over new areas of governmental activity-for

instance, perhaps regulation of CATV or other new and de-

veloping "state-sized" technologies.

The state entitlement to

immunity from federal interference would have to be based on a
judicial

determination

confined

to

that

the

that

state or

a

local

constitutional protection

judiciary

would

increase,

particular
level.
is

social

As occurs every time

expanded,

because

it

problem was

the

would

be

role
the

of
duty

the
of

courts to determine which were "state-" and "local-sized" problems that, by their nature (and not by their history), would be
immune from federal regulation.
I
advantages

suppose

one

could write

and disadvantages of

an extended essay on

such general and

the

theoretical

alternative approaches to a young doctrine like that of National League of Cities.

I will be happy to offer such an essay if

you think this helpful.

In this memo, however, I will simply

state my view--which is that an essentially historical test is
preferable

to

the

resps 1

~

proposed

interpretation.

I

so con-

'----------------------~

elude because a historical analysis articulates National League
of Cities 1 concern with preserving tradi tiona! state roles at
the same time it provides a manageable framework for deciding
cases.

I therefore would

-

revers~,

SG on pages 5-6 of this memo.

for the reasons given by the

~

~

•;r

10.

q ~ wvf)..

/

If you disagree with my view, a more pragmatic difficulty with the resps' approach remains.
issue of whether
sized"

social problem

guaranteed.
lem.

operation of
for

That difficulty is the

the LIRR in fact

which

state

is a

sovereignty

"state-

should

be

Railroad bankruptcy is not an unprecedented prob-

As Amtrack and the Gibbon case

(argued in December) make

apparent, such bankruptcies often have caused a federal rather
than a state response.
in those

Significantly, of course, the railroads

cases definitely were interstate lines, whereas the

LIRR tracks are completely intrastate.
er,

As petr argues, howev-

the LIRR remains a part of the natio.nal rail system;

it

provides the only extension that connects Long Island with nationwide

passenger

and

freight

service.

Although

interstate

freight service is comprises a tiny proportion of LIRR's revenues (4%, according to red LIRR brief at 25), in absolute terms
the

interstate

freight car

activity is substantial--involving

120,000 freight cars and two million car miles in 1979.
brief at 11-12.

Blue

(We are given no statistics on interstate pas-

senger traffic--presumably suggesting that such traffic is minimal.)
In short,

it is not plain that the bankruptcy of the

LIRR is a problem that calls for a governmental response solely
from the state level.

Due to this fact,

this may not be the

case to expand National League of Cities beyond that the limits
of a historical approach--even if you are ultimately persuaded
that such a historical analysis is an overly restrictive view

..

..
,. '
•.'

11.

of the proper constitutional federalism doctrine.
Finally, if you disagree with my view and believe that
the LIRR has the better argument up to this point, there remains the fourth

step in the National League of Cities test:

whether the nature of the federal interest is such as to justify

the

federal

invasion of

state

case illustrating this balancing is
U.S.

542

(197 5)

~

paradigm

v. United States, 421

(upholding application of

freeze to state governments).

The

sovereignty.

federal

wage-price

I am not persuaded that railroad

labor problems are of such a national priority as to countenance

this

Similarly,

unusual
the

federal

intrusion upon

Railway Labor Act

is not a

state

sovereignty.

temporary measure

that will expire once an emergency has passed.

In these re-

spects, rail labor strife is a different sort of problem than
was inflation, and the Railway Labor Act is a different sort of
law than was the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.

If the

S.G. loses up until this final test, I think he also must fail
this test as well.

III.

Conclusion

The National League of Cities test has four elements:
(1) whether a federal statute regulates "States as States;" (2)
whether

the

federal

regulation

"attributes of state sovereignty;"
directly

impairs

addresses

indisputable

( 3) whether the federal law

state ability "to structure

integral opera-

tions in areas of traditional functions;" and

( 4) whether the

'·

12.

nature of the federal interest nevertheless is such as to justify state submission.
The first prong of the National League of Cities test,

y-,

as stated by Virginia Surface Mining, is satisfied here because v.lAJ
l~

the Railway Labor Act regulates "States as States."

___,.,... '7 -

f1:J'""

,

·~~

.1

~

The second and third prongs of the test should, in my

~

view, be understood as inquiring, first, whether the challenged
federal

regulation displaces an "integral operation" of state

government,

and

second,

whether

this

occupation occurs

"traditional function" of state government.

in

a

Because decision

about the right to public employees to strike is very similar

~ ~
1
d1' splacesA~b~~· "'

to decisions about minimum wages for public employees, I think
·
t h ere 1s
no question but that the Railway Labor Act

~J

an "integral operation" of state government.
~

The crux of this case is whether running the LIRR is a

---=function"

-----

"traditional

of

state

government.

The

SG

makes

strong arguments that rail operation is not a tradition state
function as a historical matter.

If this is how this prong of

the third test is to be understood--and I think it should be so
understood--then

these

arguments are conclusive and

the case

should be reversed.
Resps

argue

that

the LIRR performs a vi tal function

for NYC.

If this prong of the third test is to respond to this

argument,

the

Court must

add

the

requirement

that

the

given

activity is one that only a state or local government will sup~·

There is some doubt whether operation of the LIRR is in-

.,

•'

.,

deed such an activity,

because operation of the LIRR does im-

plicate national interests.

But the

Co~rt

could hold for the

LIRR on these grounds if it were willing to adopt a fairly activist version of the National League of Cities doctrine.
Finally, if the LIRR prevails to this point, it should
win the whole case.

The fourth National League of Cities test

does not pose a insuperable barrier; the federal interests behind

the Railway Labor Act do not outweigh state sovereignty

interests
States.

...

in

the manner

of

the wage

freeze

in KE.Y_ v.

United
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1925

UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, PETITIONER v.
LONG ISLAND RAILROAD COMPANY, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[March-, 1982]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Tenth Amendment prohibits application of the Railway Labor Act to a
state-owned railroad engaged in i~terstate commerce.

I
The Long Island Rail Road, incorporated in 1834, provides
both freight and passenger service to Long Island. 1 In
1966, after 132 years of private ownership and a period of
steadily growing operating deficits, the railroad was acquired
by New York State through the Metropolitan Transportation
Authority.
' The railroad's western terminus is Pennsylvania Station in
Mannhattan; there it connects with lines of railroads which serve other
parts of the country. The eastern terminus is at Montauk Point, at the tip
of Long Island, but most of its main and branch line traffic originates in the
western half of Long Island, in the boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens, and
in the suburbs of Nassau and western Suffolk counties. By far the bulk of
the railroad's business is carrying commuters between Long Island's suburban communities and their places of employment in New York City.
However, the Railroad supplies Long Island's only freight service; it does a
significant volume of freight business, with 1979 freight revenue of over
$12 million.
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Thereafter, the Railroad continued to conduct collective
bargaining pursuant to the procedures of the Railway Labor
Act. 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. The United Transportation
Union, petitioner in this case, represents the Railroad's conductors, brakemen, switchmen, firemen, motormen, collectors and related train crew employees. In 1978, the Union
notified the Railroad that it desired to commence negotiations and the parties began collective bargaining as provided
by the Act. They failed to reach agreement during preliminary negotiations and, in April, 1979, the Railroad and the
Union jointly petitioned the National Mediation Board for assistance. Seven months of mediation efforts by the Board
failed to produce agreement, however, and the Board released the case from mediation. This triggered a 30-day
cooling-off period under the Act; absent Presidential intervention, the Act permits the parties to resort to economic
weapons, including strikes, upon the expiration of the cooling-off period.
The Union apparently thought the State was considering a
challenge to the applicability of the Act to the Railroad and
on December 7, one day before the expiration of the 30-day
cooling-off period, it sued in federal court seeking a declaratory jud·gment that the dispute was covered by the Railway
Labor Act and not the Taylor Law, New York's law governing public employee collective bargaining and prohibiting
strikes by public employees. 2 The next day, the Union commenced what was to be a brief strike. Pursuant to the Act,
the President of the United States intervened on December
14, thus imposing an additional 60-day cooling-off period
2
0n January 17, 1980, the Railroad responded to the Union's suit for
declaratory judgment by asserting that no justiciable controversy existed
because the railroad did not believe the Taylor Law applied and therefore
had no intention to invoke its provisions.
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which was to expire on February 13, 1980. 3 A few days before the expiration of the 60-day period, the State converted
the Railroad from a private stock corporation to a public benefit corporation, apparently believing that the change would
eliminate Railway Labor Act coverage and bring the employees under the umbrella of the Taylor Law.
The Railroad then filed suit in state court on February 13
seeking to enjoin the impending strike under the Taylor Law.
Before the state court acted, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York heard and decided the Union's suit for declaratory relief, holding that the
Railroad was a carrier subject to the Railway Labor Act, that
the Act, rather than the Taylor Law, was applicable, and
that declaratory relief was in order. United Transportation
Union v. Long Island R. R., 509 F. Supp. 1300 (EDNY
1980).
In a footnote the District Court rejected the argument now
presented to this Court that application of the Act to the
state-owned railroad was inconsistent with National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). 509 F. Supp., at
1306, n. 4. The District Court noted that in National
League of Cities, the Supreme Court "specifically held that
operation of a railroad in interstate commerce is not an integral part of government activity" and affirmed the rulings in
California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957), and United States
v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936), which held that the Railway Labor Act and the Safety Appliance Act could be applied
to state-owned railroads. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the operation
of the Long Island Railroad was an integral government
function and that the federal Act displaced "essential governmental decisions" involving that function. United Transpor3
The Presidential intervention also triggered the creation of a Presidential Emergency Board to investigate and report on the matter.

·~.
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tation Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F. 2d 19 (CA2 1980).
The court applied a balancing approach and held that the
State interest in controlling the operation of its railroad outweighed the federal interest in having the Act apply.
We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1980), and we
reverse.
II

There can be no serious question that, as both the District
Court and the Court of Appeals held, the Long Island Railroad is subject to the terms of the Railway Labor Act 4 , or
that the Commerce Clause grants Congress the plenary authority to regulate labor relations in the railroad industry in
general. 5 This dispute concerns the application of this acknowledged congressional authority to a state-owned railroad; we must decide whether that application so impairs the
ability of the state to carry out its constitutionally-preserved
sovereign function as to come into conflict with the Tenth
Amendment. 6
'The Railroad acknowledges in its brief that the Long Island's freight
service, which is admittedly engaged in interstate commerce, "eliminat[es]
any dispute regarding its coverage by the RLA." Brief for the Respondents, at 23.
In the Court of Appeals, the Railroad maintained that Congress did not
intend the Act to apply to state-owned passenger railroads. 634 F. 2d, at
23. Whatever merit that claim may have had, it is no longer tenable. After that court rendered its decision, Congress amended the Act to add section 9a, 45 U. S. C. § 159a. Section 9a establishes special procedures to be
applied to any dispute "between a publicly funded and publicly operated
carrier providing rail commuter service ... and its employees."
•see Texas & N.O.R. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks,
281 u. s. 548 (1930).
6
The Tenth Amendment provides:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by The Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.
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A
The Railroad claims immunity from the Railway Labor
Act, relying on National League of Cities v. Usery, supra,
where we held that Congress could not impose the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and local
governments. 7 That Act generally requires covered employers to pay employees no less than a minimum hourly
wage and to pay them at one and one-half times their regular
hourly rate for all time worked in any workweek in excess of
forty hours. Prior to 1974, the Act excluded most governmental employers.
However in that year Congress
amended the law to extend, in somewhat modified form, its
provisions to "public agencies," including state governments
and their political subdivisions. 8 We held that the 1974
Amendments were invalid "insofar as [they] operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. . . . "
426 U. S., at 852. (Emphasis supplied.)
Only recently we had occasion to apply the National
League of Cities doctrine in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc.,-- U. S. - - (1981).
In holding that the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of
1977, 30 U. S. C. § 1201, et seq., did not violate the Tenth
Amendment by usurping State authority over land-use regulations, we set out a three-prong test to be applied in evaluating claims under National League of Cities:
"[l]n order to succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power legislation is invalid under the reasoning of
National League of Cities must satisfy each of three requirements. First, there must be a showing that the
challenged regulation regulates the 'States as States.'
The Fair Labor Standards Act is codified at 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq.
88 Stat. 55 (1974). The 1974 amendments modified several of the definitions contained in 29 U. S. C. § 203.
7

8
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I d., at 854. Second, the federal regulation must address
matters that are indisputably 'attributes of state sovereignty.' !d., at 845. And third, it must be apparent
that the States' compliance with the federal law would
directly impair their ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions.' I d., at 852." 9
The key prong of the National League of Cities test applicable to this case is the third one, which examines whether
"the States' compliance with the federal law would directly
impair their ability 'to structure integral operations in areas
of traditional functions.'"
B
The determination of whether a federal law impairs a
State's authority with respect to "areas of traditional [State]
functions" may at times be a difficult one. In this case, however, we do not write on a clean slate. As the District Court
noted, in National League of Cities, we explicitly reaffirmed
our holding in United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175
(1936), and in two other cases involving federal regulation of
railroads: 10
"The holding of United States v. California ... is quite
consistent with our holding today. There California's
activity to which the congressional command was directed was not in an area that the states have regarded
as integral parts of their governmental activities. It
was, on the contrary, the operation of a railroad engaged
in 'common carriage by rail in interstate commerce. . . . '
297 U. S., at 182." 426 U. S., at 854, n. 18.
9
However, even if these three requirements are met, the federal statute is not automatically unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendement.
The federal interest may still be so great as to "justifly] State submission." Ibid, a t - , n. 29. Cf., Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92 (1946).
10
Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964); California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957).

80-1925---0PINION
TRANSPORTATION UNION v. LONG ISLAND R.R. CO.

7

It is thus clear that operation of a railroad engaged in interstate commerce is not an integral part of traditional state activities generally immune from federal interference under
National League of Cities. See also Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 422-424 (1978) (concurring
opinion of THE CHIEF JusTICE). 11 The Long Island is concededly a railroad engaged in interstate commerce.
The Court of Appeals distinguished the three railroad
cases discussed in National League of Cities, noting that
they dealt with freight carriers rather than primarily passenger railroads such as the Long Island. That distinction does
not warrant a different result, however. Operation of passenger railroads, no less than operation of freight railroads,
has traditionally been a function of private industry, not state
or local governments. 12 It is certainly true that some passenger railroads have come under government control in recent
years, as have several freight lines, but that does not alter
""[T]here [is] certainly no question that a State's operation of a common
carrier, even without profit and as a 'public function,' would be subject to
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause ....
. . . The National League of Cities opinion focused its delineation of the
'attributes of sovereignty' ... on a determination as to whether the State's
interest involved 'functions essential to separate and independent existence.' Ibid., quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911). It
should be evident, I would think, that the running of a business enterprise
is not an integral operation in the area of traditional government functions.
. . . Indeed, the reaffirmance of the holding in United States v. California, supra, by National League of Cities, supra, at 854, n. 18, strongly
supports this understanding." Ibid., at 422-424 (CHIEF JUSTICE BuRGER, concurring).
12
At the time of this suit, there were 17 commuter railroads in the
United States; only two of those railroads were publicly owned and operated, both by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. American Public Transit Association, Transit Fact Book 74-75 (1979). Those two public
railroads the long Island and the Staten Island were originally private
reilroads. The Staten Island was founded in 1899 and acquired by the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority in 1971. Moody's Transportation
Manual 97 (1979).
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the historical reality that the operation of railroads is not
among the functions traditionally performed by State and local governments. Federal regulation of state-owned railroads simply does not impair a State's ability to function as a
State.

III
In concluding that the operation of a passenger railroad is
not among those governmental functions generally immune
from federal regulation under National League of Cities, we
are not merely following dicta of that decision or looking only
to the past to determine what is "traditional." In essence,
National League of Cities held that under most circumstances federal power to regulate commerce could not be exercised in such a manner as to undermine the role of the
States in our federal system. This Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional aspects of
state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical
view of state functions generally immune from federal regulation. Rather it was meant to require an inquiry into
whether the federal regulation affects basic State prerogatives in such a way as would be likely to hamper the state
government's ability to fulfill its role in the Union and endanger its "separate and independent existence." Ibid, at 851.
Just as the federal government cannot usurp traditional
state functions, there is no justification for a rule which
would allow the States, by acquiring functions previously
performed by the private sector, to erode federal authority in
areas traditionally subject to federal statutory regulation.
Railroads have been subject to comprehensive federal regulation for nearly a century. 13 The Interstate Commerce Act13
The initial exercise of the federal authority over railroads occurred before the completion of the first transcontinental railroad. See the Pacific
Railroad Act of 1862. 12 Stat. 489. Of course, federal regulation of interstate transportation goes back many more years than that. See the 1793
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the first comprehensive federal regulation of the industrywas passed in 1887. 14 A year earlier we had held that only
the federal government, not the states, could regulate the interstate rates of railroads. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 (1886). The first federal statute dealing
with railroad labor relations was the Arbitration Act of
1888; 15 the provisions of that Act were invoked by President
Cleveland in reaction to the Pullman strike of 1894. Federal
mediation of railroad labor disputes was first provided by the
Erdman Act of 1898 16 and strengthened by the Newlands Act
of 1913. 17 In 1916, Congress mandated the eight-hour-day in
the railroad industry. 18 After federal operation of the railroads during World War I, Congress passed the Transportation Act of 1920, 19 which further enhanced federal involvement in railroad labor relations. Finally, in 1926, Congress
passed the Railway Labor Act, which was jointly drafted by
representatives of the railroads and the railroad unions. 2Q
Act regulating coastal trade discussed in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1
(1824).
14
24 Stat. 379.
15
25 Stat. 501.
16
30 Stat. 424.
" 38 Stat. 103.
18
Adamson Act of 1916, 30 Stat. 721.
19
41 Stat. 456.
20
Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577. 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.
The purposes of the Railway Labor Act are set out in Section 2 of the Act,
45 U. S. C. § 151a:
"The purposes of the chapter are: (1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any
limitation upon freedom of association among employees or any denial, as a
condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a
labor organization; (3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers
and of employees in the matter of self-organization to carry out the
pruposes of this chapter; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions;
(5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing
out of greivances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements

Sa-1925--0PINION
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The Act has been amended a number of times since 1926, but
its basic structure has remained intact. The Railway Labor
Act thus has provided the framework for collective bargaining between all interstate railroads and their employees for
the past 56 years. There is no similar history of longstanding State regulation of railroad collective bargaining or of
other aspects of the railroad industry.
Moreover, the federal government has determined that a
uniform regulatory scheme is necessary to the operation of
the national rail system. In particular, Congress long ago
concluded that federal regulation of railroad labor relations is
necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential
to the national economy. A disruption of service on any portion of the interstate railroad system can cause serious problems throughout the system. Congress determined that the
most effective means of preventing such disruptions is by
way of requiring and facilitating free collective bargaining between railroads and the labor organizations representing
their employees.
Rather than absolutely prohibiting
strikes, Congress decided to assure equitable settlement of
railroad labor disputes, and thus prevent interruption of rail
service, by providing mediation and imposing cooling-off periods, thus creating "an almost interminable" collective bargaining process. Detroit & T. S. L. R.R. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U. S. 142, 149 (1969). "[T]he
procedures of the Act are purposely long and drawn out,
based on the hope that reason and practical considerations
will provide in time an agreement that resolves the dispute."
Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks v. Florida E.
C. R.Co., 384 U. S. 238, 246 (1966). 21 To allow individual
covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions."
21
Under the recent amendments to the Act, adding a new Section 9a, 45
U. S. C. § 159a, the process has been made even more "long and drawn
out" insofar as it applies to publicly-owned commuter rail lines such as the
Long Island. The law now provides for a "cooling-off period" of up to 240
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States, by acquiring railroads, to countermand the federal
system of railroad bargaining, or any of the other elements of
federal regulation of railroads, would destroy the uniformity
thought essential by Congress and would endanger the efficient operation of the interstate rail system.
In addition, a State acquiring a railroad does so knowing
that the railroad is subject to this longstanding and comprehensive scheme of federal regulation of its operations and its
labor relations. See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 568
(1957). It is particularly clear in the present case that the
State acquired the railroad with full awareness that it was
subject to federal regulation under the Railway Labor Act.
At the time of the acquisition, a spokesman stated:
"We just have a new owner and a new board of directors. We're under the Railway Labor Act, just as we've
always been. The people do not become state employes,
they remain railroad employes and retain all the benefits
and drawbacks of that."
The parties proceeded along those premises for the next thirteen years, with both sides making use of the procedures
available under the Railway Labor Act, and with Railroad
employees covered by the Railroad Retirement Act, the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act and the Federal Employdays after failure of mediation. Any party to the dispute, or the Governor
of any State through which the rail service operates, may request appointment of a Presidential Emergency Board to investigate and report on the
dispute. If the dispute is not settled within 60 days after creation of the
Emergency Board, the National Mediation Board must hold a public hearing at which each party must appear and explain any refusal to accept the
Emergency Board's recommendations. The law then requires appointment of a second Emergency Board at the request of any party or Governor of an affected State. That Emergency Board must examine the final
offers submitted by each party and must determine which is the most reasonable. Finally, if a work stoppage occurs, substantial penalties are provided against the party refusing to accept the offer determined by the
Emergency Board to be most reasonable.

•.

•'
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ers' Liability Act. Conversely, Railroad employees were
not eligible for any of the retirement, insurance or job security benefits of New York civil servants.
There is thus strong evidence not only that the State knew
of and accepted the federal regulation, but also that it was
able to operate under federal regulation without any noticeable impairment of its traditional sovereignty. Indeed, the
State's initial response to this suit was to acknowledge that
the Railway Labor Act applied. It can thus hardly be maintained that imposition of the Act on the State's operation of
the Railroad is likely to impair the State's ability to fulfill its
role in the Union or to endanger the "separate and independent existence" referred to in National League of Cities v.
Usery, supra, at 851.
IV
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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